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Introduction
Recent research in household …nance shows that investment mistakes have large costs. This paper describes a proposal aimed at reducing these mistakes by improving the way in which households invest their savings. Therefore, the paper contributes to the …eld of household …nancial engineering by building on Campbell households do invest (positive household …nance), and highlight discrepancies between the two (investment mistakes). I show that these investment mistakes are costly. In advanced economies, they are likely to add up to more than 1 percent of GDP, with an estimated total cost of $450 billion. 1 Next, I suggest that investment mistakes could be reduced with a process of …nancial education and modi…ed versions of already available ETF-like instruments that track a world equity index. To increase its salience and transform the process into a learning by investing activity, I suggest that …nancial education should be delivered when a household decides to invest and that it should provide concrete advice based on simple rules of thumb.
The paper contributes to the on-going debate on the causes and consequences of increasing income and wealth inequality in advanced economies. Empirical evidence suggests that initial wealth inequality is ampli…ed by di¤erences in investment strategies across income groups. It is also possible that investment mistakes of naive (and often poorer) households generate cross-subsidies which end up bene…tting more sophisticated (and richer) investors (Gabaix and Liabson 2006) . Policies that attenuate these di¤erences in investors' beha-1 Sections 2-4 show that in the US, fees related to active investing are close to $110 billion. This …gure does not include the costs of non-participation and underdiversi…cation. In Sweden (the only country for which …gures are available), costs of non-participation and underdiversi…cation add up to one percent of GDP.
Figures for Sweden and the US are likely to be a lower bound for investment mistakes in other advanced economies because US and Swedish households tend to be more …nancially sophisticated than households in other countries.
vior can therefore play a role in reducing income and wealth inequality and can spread the returns of world growth more evenly.
At the macro level, the proposal described in this paper can stimulate growth by reducing the cost of equity capital, promoting risk-sharing, and creating demand for long-term …nancial products that are well-suited to …nance infrastructure projects.
I focus on the allocation of a given amount of savings. Therefore, I do not discuss the equally important issue of how to increase savings. 2 Moreover, the proposal described in this paper requires a moderate savings capacity and is targeted to households who already own some basic formal …nancial instruments, such as a checking account. Hence, the paper will not cover issues that are speci…c to the poor in low-income countries where nearly 60 percent of the population does not have a bank account (Karlan et al. 2014 ). The ideas discussed in this paper are instead relevant for the middle-class in emerging market countries and most segments of the population in advanced economies.
How should households invest?
Given the need to plan over a lifetime, developing an optimal strategy for household investment is a di¢ cult task. While standard investment models assume that all wealth is both liquid and tradable (Merton 1969 (Merton , 1971 , in most households the largest components of wealth are human capital and housing. The latter is tradable but lumpy and illiquid and the former is neither tradable nor pledgeable as collateral. As a consequence, households, especially young households, are often credit and liquidity constrained.
Di¤erences in risk aversion are a key element in determining optimal investment behavior. If all investors have access to the same set of …nancial assets, investment choices should be fully driven by the degree of risk aversion. If risk aversion does not depend on wealth (a constant Arrow-Pratt degree of risk aversion, or CRRA, in technical jargon) all investors, rich and poor, should hold the same share of risky assets in their portfolio. If, instead, investors'preferences display decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA), the optimal share of risky assets increases with wealth. 3 Because of uncertainty about optimal investors'behavior, Campbell (2006) states that:
"Until some consensus is reached, normative household …nance should emphasize results that are robust to alternative speci…cation of household utility."
There is at least one result that appears to be robust to a large class of models: all investors should participate in all risky asset markets by investing in a portfolio which includes all securities with weights which are proportional to the market capitalization of each security (the market portfolio).
With constant relative risk aversion, the share of …nancial assets invested in the market portfolio should be the same for all households. With decreasing risk aversion the share of assets invested in the market portfolio should be increasing with wealth. However, the premium associated with holding risky assets is so large (Mehra and Prescott 1985 ) that all households should hold a positive fraction of their …nancial wealth in the risky market portfolio.
How do households invest?
Data on actual investment behavior are hard to obtain because household …nance surveys are costly to implement and individual investors, especially the wealthy ones, do not like to disclose information about their …nancial assets (in the US, non-response ratios among the wealthiest groups are above 50 percent, Campbell, 2006) . Such surveys exist for most advanced economies but, in order to obtain reasonable response ratios, they do not in- 3 Decreasing relative risk aversion can be justi…ed with utility functions that have non-standard bequest motives, habit formation, or consumption commitments. Research shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in risk aversion across households and that risk aversion is negatively correlated with wealth and IQ and positively correlated with the volatility of labor income and the presence of credit constraints (Guiso and Sodini 2013 review the literature). These …ndings suggest that the optimal share of risky assets should be higher for wealthier households and for households with more stable jobs and access to well-working …nancial markets. There is also evidence that women are more risk averse than men, that risk aversion increases with age and with exposure to risk in the past, and that there is a genetic component of risk-taking. 4 clude speci…c questions about asset composition. These surveys can be used to estimate household participation in di¤erent asset classes but cannot be used to estimate the cost of investment mistakes. The only comprehensive and detailed data sources of household …nance are administrative data for countries that have a comprehensive wealth tax.
Investment mistake I: Non-participation
Theory suggests that all households should participate in all …nancial markets and thus hold risky …nancial assets. However, only a small share of households participates in such markets. Table 1 reports data for direct and indirect (through mutual and pension funds) stock ownership. In most countries less than 50 percent of households own stocks (the exception is Sweden where 66 percent of households hold stocks). There are also large cross-country di¤erences. The share of households who own stocks is below 10 percent in Austria, Greece, Italy, and Spain, and less than one-third of households hold stocks in France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK.
The table shows that the share of households who own stocks increases with wealth (a …nding consistent with the presence of decreasing relative risk-aversion). However, even when we look at relatively wealthy households we …nd that stock ownership is low. At the top 25 percent of the wealth distribution, we …nd 9 countries (out of 12) where less than two-thirds of households hold stocks. Even at the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution stock ownership is far from universal, with 8 countries where less than three-quarters of households own stocks.
Three things are worth noting:
1. Even in the country with the highest rate of participation in the stock market, onethird of households do not hold any stocks.
2. While we do not have data for developing and emerging market countries, Table 1 suggests that there is a positive correlation between income per capita and particip- Source: Guiso and Sodini (2013) ation in risky …nancial assets. It is thus likely that data for developing and emerging market countries would reveal even lower participation rates.
3. Sweden is the only country for which there are precise estimates of the cost of investment mistakes. Given that Swedish households appear to be more …nancially sophisticated than households in other advanced economies (or, at least, they have the highest rate of participation in risky assets), it is reasonable to assume that Swedish data provide a lower bound for the cost of investment mistakes in other countries. Table 2 looks at a broader measure of risky asset ownership (stocks, mutual funds, and bonds). Again, we …nd low average participation (the overall average for the eurozone is 20 percent). As before, the participation rate increases with wealth but remains low even for relatively wealthy households. The eurozone average goes from 3 percent for the bottom quintile to 55 percent for the top 5 percent of the wealth distribution. As before, there are large di¤erences across countries. Average participation rates go from 4 percent in Greece and Slovakia to 39 percent in Finland ( Table 2 only includes countries that are part of the eurozone and therefore does not have data for Sweden). Such large heterogeneity also Summing up, while theory suggests that all households should own at least some risky …nancial asset, a large proportion of households does not hold any risky …nancial asset.
This is the …rst investment mistake. ) show that these two types of investors are di¤erent from each other. After controlling for these di¤erences and allowing for endogeneity in the decision of whether to use the services of a …nancial advisor, they …nd that the use of …nancial advisors leads to lower returns and higher portfolio risk. 4 These two factors are correlated. The local bias is higher for investors who do not hold foreign stocks. The same authors also …nd that funds sold by brokers do not have lower non-distribution expenses and that using a broker does not improve market timing or attenuate investment biases in terms of return-chasing. Finally, they …nd that brokers push funds with higher distribution fees. 5 This latter result is in line with the hypothesis that brokers do not always act in their clients'best interest. 3. Financial sophistication is a mixed blessing. Wealthier and more educated households hold more e¢ cient portfolios of risky assets (i.e., portfolios with higher Sharpe ratios) but overinvest in risky assets. While e¢ cient portfolios reduce investment losses of these households, excessive risk-taking increases losses. Since the latter e¤ect dominates the former, the average loss from underdiversi…cation is larger for sophisticated households. Underdiversi…cation of households who participate in risky …nancial markets leads to an average return loss of $740. 7 By applying this …gure to the 3 million households (62 percent of total) that participate in risky …nancial asset markets, we obtain $2.2 billion.
The costs of investment mistakes
The average loss of non-participation is instead $342 which multiplied by the 1.8 million households that do not participate yields a total of $620 million. A rough estimate of the total annual cost of investment mistakes of Swedish households is thus $2.8 billion, slightly above 1 percent of Swedish GDP in 2002. While the loss of the median Swedish household is low, the total is a large number. 8 Campbell (2006) discusses several reasons why Swedish households are likely to invest better than households in other countries ( Tables 1 and 3 show that Sweden is the advanced economy with the highest share of participants in risky …nancial markets). If this is the case, one percent of GDP could be a lower bound for the overall cost of investment mistakes in other countries. These considerations suggest that there are large potential gains from policies that increase the e¢ ciency of household investment strategies. French (2008) estimates the cost of active investing in the US for the 1980-2007 period. 9 He …nds that these costs have been roughly constant, hovering around 60-70 basis points of total equity market capitalization. Using data for 2007, he estimates that a complete switch of all US-based equity investors from active to passive investment strategies would yield saving of about $109 billion. 10 If we apply French's (2008) estimates of the cost of active investing to market capitalization in 2014 (about $29 trillion), we obtain a cost of active investment of about $191 billion.
French also estimates that the present value of the savings brought about by switching to passive investing would amount to approximately 10 percent of market capitalization (i.e., nearly $3 trillion using end of 2014 data).
French's calculations cover the whole US equity market. I obtain comparable results by concentrating on the US mutual fund industry. In 2014 US investors held $11 trillion of actively managed mutual funds (equity, bond, and hybrid) and $2 trillion of indexed mutual funds (Table 5) . Average fees for managed funds were 86 and 63 basis points (for equity and bond funds, respectively) and average fees for indexed funds were 11 basis points. If all investors were to migrate to indexed funds, average fees as a percentage of total assets would drop by 55 basis points, corresponding to a savings of nearly $73 billion (Table 6 ). French (2008) discusses several reasons why his estimates are likely to be a lower bound of the actual costs of active investment. 11 One additional cost is the interest margin of intermediaries. However, he points out that one key non-monetary cost of active investment is that active investors are not well-diversi…ed (see investment mistake II). Therefore, these investors could increase their returns and lower their risk by switching to a passive market portfolio index, even if this index charged the same expenses of an actively managed fund. If we were to assume that mutual funds in the rest of the world had the same composition and fee structure of US mutual funds, worldwide migration to index funds would entail a saving of $160 billion (last two columns of Table 6 ). This is likely to be a lower bound for world-level savings because in most countries average mutual fund fees (not adjusted for composition) are higher than in the US (Table 7) . French (2008) recognizes that moving all investment to index funds would not be optimal for society because active trading is necessary for price discovery. While it is impossible to assess whether, at $191 billion per year, society invests too much or too little in price discovery, price discovery is an externality and it is not clear why individual investors are willing to pay for it. From the point of view of individual investors, active investment is clearly a mistake.
The roots of investment mistakes
Why don't households participate in risky asset markets? Why don't they diversify? Why do they pay a premium for …nancial advice that delivers sub-par performance? The most likely explanation for non-participation at low levels of wealth is the pres- Loss aversion refers to a situation in which the pain that an investor feels from a loss is much stronger than the pleasure from an equivalent gain (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
Loss aversion, which already reduces investors' willingness to take compensated risk, is ampli…ed by myopia (i.e., the tendency to evaluate outcomes more frequently than needed).
Experimental evidence shows that these two factors lead to suboptimal risk-taking and investment performance (Benartzi and Like non-participation, underdiversi…cation can be the outcome of …xed learning and transaction costs (Brennan 1975 ). There is also evidence of "brand loyalty." Investors are more likely to buy stocks of companies that produce their favorite products and services, and portfolios composed by these stocks underperform. This …nding supports Fama and French's (2007) idea that many households consider …nancial assets as consumption goods.
We also saw that the incentives of …nancial advisors are not always aligned with those of their clients. Why are investors willing to pay for advice that leads to undeperformance? Gennaioli et al. (2015) suggest that it is because money managers provide peace of mind.
In a …rst best world, households would just invest in passive index funds. However, anxiety may prevent investors from participating in risky assets and money managers provide a valuable service because, with peace of mind, investors are more likely to take risk and earn higher returns. In this sense, money managers are second-best optimal.
Summing up, investment mistakes are likely to be the outcome of cognitive biases and limitations and distorted incentives in the …nancial industry. These biases and limitations are likely to be very important in making …nancial decisions because such decisions are made infrequently and have delayed outcomes (Campbell et al. 2011) . It is also di¢ cult to learn from others because people do not like to disclose information about their …nancial situation.
Any proposal that aims at reducing investment mistakes needs to acknowledge and accommodate these biases and distorted incentives. It needs to be salient, increase trust, focus on an investment strategy with low monetary and psychological transaction costs, and inform investors about the possibly distorted incentives of …nancial advisors.
Reducing investment mistakes
This section describes a simple proposal aimed at reducing the prevalence and cost of investment mistakes. The proposal combines …nancial education with a list of pre-approved funds (either mutual funds or ETFs) that meet the criteria for optimal investment.
In many countries potential investors are required to complete forms aimed at assessing their degree of risk aversion and ability to understand and bear risk. These forms, however, do not give speci…c guidance on what investors should do. I propose to provide investors with such speci…c guidance. The proposal is related to Swensen's (2005) idea of subsidizing low-cost passive mutual funds. However, instead of using tax incentives, I suggest to nudge (Sunstein and Thaler 2008) households towards e¢ cient investment with an information campaign and appropriate default options while maintaining complete freedom of choice. 12 Financial education should be simple, speci…c, and delivered when households are ready to invest. I propose that before making any investment decision, investors should be asked to read a simple lea ‡et that describes common investment mistakes and provides speci…c advice on optimal investment strategies. The speci…c advice will include the optimal share of …nancial wealth that should be invested in risky assets and the type of risky assets that households should buy (low-fee passively-managed funds that track a global index of stocks). The lea ‡et will also include endorsements from autoritative bodies and institutions with strong reputation and no obvious con ‡ict of interest (Choi et al. 2002 (Choi et al. , 2004 , show that such endorsements in ‡uence household behavior), a list of investment funds that satisfy the requirements for e¢ cient investment, and an explanation that these funds can be bought with a small minimum investment ($50 in my example). The Appendix includes an example of the lea ‡et (this is a rough draft, the actual ‡yer will need to be designed by marketing experts).
After reading the lea ‡et, investors will be asked to answer two or three simple questions aimed at assessing their comprehension of the material and then they will be free to make whatever investment decision they want -even if it deviates from the e¢ cient investment strategy suggested in the lea ‡et. This latter element is essential for maintaining freedom of choice.
There are two approaches to …nancial education: standard training and rule-of-thumb. My proposal recognizes these cognitive biases and addresses them by using a simple default option (to deal with information overload) and by delivering …nancial education when it is most salient and that can be enhanced with a learning by investing component.
The proposal also recognizes that the interests of …nancial institutions and …nancial advisors are not always aligned with those of investors (see above). Financial institutions and advisors often have incentives to promote ine¢ cient high-fees managed investment products. However, it may be di¢ cult to push such products to potential investors who have just read a lea ‡et stating that investing in actively managed …nancial products is generally not a good idea. This is the case even if the lea ‡et does not provide new information. There is a psychological cost in confronting a …nancial advisor who is providing bad advice and the lea ‡et may reduce this cost. The "common knowledge" situation (I know that you know, you know that I know that you know, ...) can change the equilibrium of the game between clients and …nancial advisors (Lewis 1969 and Aumann 1976) .
One drawback of providing advice when households are ready to invest is that this strategy misses all households that are not even thinking about investing. This problem could be addressed by placing posters in banks and post o¢ ces and with TV and press campaigns. It would also be possible to send the lea ‡et with bank statements, explaining that this is not an advertisement campaign of the bank but a public initiative endorsed by all the organizations listed in the ‡yer.
The proposal is based on a simple rule of thumb investment strategy which does not consider di¤erences in ownerships of real assets and labor income shocks. 13 However, shocks to labor income are mostly idiosyncratic (therefore, non-diversi…able and almost irrelevant for investment decisions) and research based on direct stock ownership does not …nd any evidence that households use their …nancial portfolio to hedge income shocks (Massa and Simonov 2006) .
A robust result of the literature on …nancial education is that "simple is better" (Karlan et al. 2014 ). Therefore, instead of being a problem, a simple default investment option is likely to increase participation while allowing sophisticated investors to be as ‡exible as they want to be.
Non-participation in risky assets might be driven by mistrust in banks and …nancial institutions. For instance, Coupe (2011) …nds that more than 50 percent of Ukrainian households save in cash and that households who self-report as having low trust in banks are 10 to 15 percentage points more likely to keep all their savings in cash at home. One way to address this problem and reach a larger number of potential households is to issue low value (say $50) physical bearable certi…cates that households can buy and sell without any fee in banks and post o¢ ces at a price that is …xed daily and is widely disseminated in newspapers and on the internet and TV. 14 
Challenges
I see three main challenges to the proposal described in this paper.
Lobbying
A massive move to low-fee index trackers is likely to be disruptive for individuals and institutions that bene…t from the status quo. Banks may su¤er because deposits, which are a source of cheap funds, may shrink. Providers of managed …nancial products may lose clients and fee income. Sophisticated investors may lose bene…ts arising from crosssubsidies within the …nancial industry (Gabaix and Liabson 2006) . Governments will face more competition for funds and possibly face higher borrowing costs. 15 Therefore, these agents may decide to lobby against the proposal described in this paper. The best way to contrast this lobbying e¤ort is to engage with consumer associations.
Another good idea would be to start with a small program and subject it to a rigorous evaluation using the randomized control techniques that are common in development economics.
Large losses
A worldwide equity market crash soon after the inception of the program would be disastrous for the program (and for the households who invested in it).
One way to deal with this issue is a gradual implementation of the program. One could envisage a situation in which households who never held risky assets are suggested to invest a very small share (much smaller than what would be optimal) of their …nancial wealth in risky assets. While a negligible allocation of …nancial wealth in risky assets would not have any impact (either positive or negative) on total wealth, it would change the status quo.
Status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988 ) is a robust result in behavior economics. A policy that induces households to move from no investment in risky assets to some investment in risky assets (even if the level of investment in risky assets is negligible) could change the status quo and have a powerful e¤ect on …nancial education (remember that Tables 1-3 show that in most countries only a minority of households invests in risky assets). As households learn by investing, they will feel more comfortable in taking more risky assets in their portfolio and also acquire the peace of mind which may set them free from costly money doctors (Gennaioli et al. 2015) .
Less price discovery and innovation
Active traders provide a service to society because they contribute to price discovery, supply liquidity to the market, and may contribute to the development of innovative …nancial products (however, there is also the view that too much trading can increase volatility).
Therefore, there is the risk that a massive shift to index products may result in prices that are misaligned with fundamentals and sti ‡e …nancial innovation. A large shift to index tracking may also crystallize the status quo (who decides what is in the index?), possibly giving an unfair advantage to incumbents and starving new companies and frontier markets that need …nancing to grow.
While these considerations suggest that my proposal may become a victim of its own success, it is worth pointing out that the bene…ts of …nancial innovation have been elusive. 16 Moreover, at the margin there will always be incentives to identify misspriced assets. How-ever, the question raised above (is price discovery worth $190 billion per year?) is indeed an important question.
A related issue is that a massive reduction in home bias may lead to possibly destabilizing ‡ows to emerging market countries and reduce bank lending to small and medium enterprises. I brie ‡y discuss these problems in the next section.
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Growth and macro-level e¤ects
There are several channels through which greater participation in risky assets may have a positive e¤ect on growth and welfare.
Cost of capital
The …rst and most basic of these channels is greater investment brought about by a reduction in the cost of capital. Table 8 reports data on equity premia in 21 advanced economies and 17 emerging markets. The average equity premium in the …rst group of countries is 6.3 percent (ranging between 2 percent in New Zealand and 17 percent in Greece) and the average premium in emerging markets is 12 percent (ranging between 3 percent in Indonesia and 25 percent in Chile).
Greater participation in risky assets would reduce these equity premia and, through a standard Tobin's Q argument, increase investment. If at least part of this investment is productive, countries will transition to higher steady-state income and experience higher GDP growth during the transition period.
This channel is likely to be especially bene…cial for emerging market countries that have larger equity premia and may receive large in ‡ows if investors in advanced economies reduce their home bias.
Such transition, however, may also entail risks and its general equilibrium consequences will need to be carefully explored with a formal model. Massive ‡ows to risky assets can create bubbles and feed into a "this time is di¤erent" attitude that, as documented by Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2009) , always leads to tragedy. Flows to emerging market countries can also lead to currency appreciation and …nancial protectionism. Flows to risky assets are also likely to reduce bank deposits and, in turn, bank lending. This could be a good thing if lower bank lending leads to lower housing …nance (a key driver of real estate bubbles, Jordà et al. 2015) . However, it could be bad news for small and medium enterprises which disproportionately rely on bank …nancing.
Greater risk-sharing
Lower home bias will also increase international risk-sharing (which remains low even in an era of …nancial globalization, Kose et al. 2006 ). The e¤ect of risk-sharing on growth is, however, ambiguous. In a model with precautionary savings, lower risk decreases savings and, in a neoclassical model, it has a negative e¤ect on steady-state income (and growth during the transition to the new steady state). However, risk-sharing may also channel savings into riskier but more productive technologies and thus have a positive e¤ect on growth. In a calibrated model, Femminis (2001) …nds that the latter e¤ect dominates the former.
Recent attempts to estimate the growth and welfare impact of risk-sharing through …nancial globalization found heterogeneous e¤ects which depend on the structure of shocks, the size of countries, and their initial degree of capital scarcity (Courdacier et al., 2015) . 17 A di¤ erent type of portfolio ‡ows for closing the infrastructure gap A common result in the literature on the growth e¤ects of …nancial globalization is that while foreign direct investments (FDI) have a positive e¤ect on growth, portfolio ‡ows have no e¤ect on growth and may have negative e¤ects in terms of increasing capital account volatility and the probability of …nancial crises. 18 Hence, economists and policymakers are often comfortable with policies that do not pose any limit to FDI in ‡ows but are more cautious in advocating full capital account liberalization. 19 The Original Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990 Increasing the ability of households to place savings in capital markets by promoting the use of mutual funds, exchange-traded funds, and retail brokerages.
Provide widespread consumer …nancial education initiatives to explain the bene…ts of diversi…ed sources of savings and of compounded annual returns.
Distributional e¤ ects
The careful reader will have noted a tension between the main bene…t listed in this section (higher income brought about by lower cost of capital) and the main bene…t of holding risky assets discussed in the previous section (higher risk-adjusted returns). In a perfect world there wouldn't be an equity premium puzzle and the di¤erential between the returns of risky and safe assets would be fully consistent with standard risk-aversion measures.
While we are far from a perfect world (and we will be far from it for a long time), it is worth thinking about the distributional consequences of the policy advocated in this 26 paper. 20 Given that under the status quo risky assets are held by the wealthy, greater participation in risky assets (which will increase their price and lower their return) will have an ambiguous e¤ect on the portfolio of the rich. 21 The e¤ect on the middle-class who moves from low to high return assets should, instead, be unambiguously positive. The poorest segments of the population may still decide not to hold any …nancial assets. Therefore, they will not be a¤ected by this policy, unless the shift to risky assets leads to an increase in the interest rate of government bonds and the government decides to compensate for higher borrowing costs with regressive taxes or less social expenditure.
A widespread shift to index investing is also likely to reduce average income in the …nancial industry. Given that wages in the …nancial industry tend to be high (Philippon and Reshef 2012), such a transition will reduce income inequality. 
Conclusions
Households make costly investment mistakes. Active investment strategies underperform with respect to low cost funds that track the market portfolio. Yet, US-based investors spend nearly $200 billion in fees related to active investment strategies. These fees are only part of the total cost of investment mistakes. Swedish data (the only country for which we have detailed information) show that the costs of non-participation and underdiversi…cation add up to one percent of GDP. As US and Swedish households are likely to be more …nancially sophisticated than households in other countries, one percent of GDP ($450 billion) is 2 0 What follows assumes that the growth e¤ect discussed above has no e¤ect on income inequality (Dollar and Kraay 2002). 2 1 There will be an immediate capital gain and lower returns in the future. These two e¤ects will compensate each other for existing holdings but the rich will su¤er from lower returns when they increase their holdings of risky assets. However, if the rich also make investment mistakes (in terms of taking uncompensated risk), an indexed portfolio may increase their risk-adjusted returns.
probably a lower bound for the total cost of investment mistakes in advanced economies.
Investment mistakes also tend to be regressive because …nancial sophistication is positively correlated with wealth and education. Therefore, a policy that reduces investment mistakes is likely to reduce income and wealth inequality (this e¤ect, however, is likely to be small).
The proposal described in this paper is based on results in economics and …nance that emphasize behavioral biases like loss aversion, myopia, status quo bias, and lack of trust. It also incorporates recent evidence that …nancial literacy programs based on simple heuristics, rule-of-thumb strategies, and default options are more e¤ective than traditional education programs. Finally, it recognizes that there is often a con ‡ict of interest between …nan-cial advisors and retail investors because the former may have monetary incentives to sell complex …nancial products that have high fees and often underperform with respect to the market portfolios.
The proposal builds on the idea that information needs to be easy to understand and salient. It uses a simple learning-by-investing program which aims at reducing the transaction, information, and psychological costs of investing in high-return risky …nancial assets.
The policy can even be e¤ective if does not provide new information because, by creating "common knowledge," it reduces the psychological cost of confronting a …nancial advisor who is providing bad advice. 22 The policy described in this paper is immediately actionable at no cost (or at a very low cost) and can have a large e¤ect on the welfare of middle-class households in advanced economies. 2 2 Friends who have PhDs in economics and who know perfectly well that active investment is a bad idea, told me that when their …nancial advisor comes up with strange investment ideas which are clearly aimed at maximizing fees (instead of returns), they feel a psychological discomfort in confronting the advisor. The outcome is that they either do not invest or end up investing is sub-optimal …nancial products.
A Example of Flyer
Below is an example of the content of ‡yer advocated in this paper. The actual ‡yer will need to be designed by marketing experts and its content will be tested with focus groups and adapted to the national context.
How to Make the Most of Your Savings
Investing your savings can be both intimidating and confusing. Most households, rich and poor, make costly mistakes when they manage their savings.
This ‡yer illustrates the most common investment mistakes and suggests a simple strategy for avoiding these mistakes and improving how you manage your savings. Its content is based on a vast body of research in economics and …nance and has been approved by: LIST OF REPUTABLE BODIES AND INSTITUTIONS.
Investment mistake I: Households are exceedingly conservative with their savings. Taking too much risk is always a bad idea, but research shows that most households would bene…t from allocating part of their savings to …nancial assets that, at the cost of higher volatility, o¤er higher average returns. Over the medium and long run a well-diversi…ed investment in stocks outperforms holding money in bank deposits or government bonds.
The share of assets to be allocated to high return assets depends on individual household circumstances and total wealth. However, even households with limited …nancial wealth should hold some high return …nancial assets. The table in the back of this ‡yer provides a guide for allocating …nancial wealth into high-return risky assets and lower return safer assets.
Investment mistake II: Households who buy risky assets do not diversify enough. Households who buy equities often hold a small number of stocks, which tend to be of domestic companies or even of companies that are geographically close to the household. Households who buy mutual funds often hold mutual funds that overwhelmingly invest in domestic companies. Research shows that households should invest in a globally diversi…ed portfolio of stocks that includes companies located in all countries and world regions, where the weight of each stock is equal to its share in the total capitalization of the world equity market.
Investment mistake III: Households who buy risky assets are sometimes too active in buying and selling stocks. Excessive trading may lead to suboptimal performance and asset misallocation. Research shows that households should invest in a globally diversi…ed portfolio of stocks that includes companies located in all countries and world regions and should only buy and sell to rebalance their portfolio according to the investment shares illustrated by the table in the back of this ‡yer.
Investment mistake IV: Households sometimes buy managed investment products with high fees and suboptimal returns. Financial advisors and institutions may have an incentive to sell products (either mutual funds or managed wealth products) with actively managed investment positions. On average, these products do not yield superior returns (compared with overall market return) and, because of high fees, often yield returns that are substantially lower than the market return. Research shows that households should invest in low-fee passively-managed funds that track a global index of stocks that includes companies located in all countries and world regions where the weight of each stock is equal to its share in the total capitalization of the world equity market.
Avoiding investment mistakes
There is a simple strategy to avoid the four investment mistakes listed above. You should allocate part of your …nancial wealth to higher return risky assets by investing in a low fee passively managed globally diversi…ed portfolio of stocks that includes companies located in all countries and world regions where the weight of each stock is equal to its share in the total capitalization of the world equity market.
The table in the back of this is ‡yer will help you in deciding what share of your …nancial wealth should be invested in high-return risky …nancial assets. Below the table you will …nd a list of low-fee passively-managed internationally diversi…ed funds that meet the requirements for optimal investment. Each of these funds can be bought with a minimum investment of $50.
You should be aware that there is always a risk involved in investing in high-return assets. As a consequence you should avoid taking too much risk by exceeding the investment shares reported in the table.
You (and your …nancial advisor) may have investment ideas that deviate from the suggestions of this lea ‡et and, of course, you are free to act on these ideas. However, you should be aware that by doing so you are likely to deviate from best practices in household …nancial investment and that sometimes …nancial advisors have monetary incentives linked to selling high-fee products which end up underperforming the simple investment strategy proposed in this ‡ier. You should ask your …nancial advisor about this potential con ‡ict of interest. This table provides an easy-to-use method to allocate your …nancial savings (de…ned as cash, bank accounts, mutual funds, and individual stocks and bonds) between safe low-return assets (such as bank deposits and short-term government bonds) and riskier high-return assets (a well diversi…ed basket of stocks). Each cell gives a range for the share of risky assets, more risk-averse households should choose values close to the bottom end of this range, while households that can bear more risk should choose a value close to the upper end of the range.
For example, a households where the main income earner is 35 years old (or the average age of the main income earners is 35) and has …nancial savings equal to 8 times to the household's monthly income should allocate between 45 and 75 percent of its …nancial wealth to risky higher-return …nancial assets. A household with a income earner aged 45 and …nancial savings equal to 40 times monthly income should instead allocate between 65 and 90 of its …nancial wealth to risky higher return …nancial assets.
List of Investment Funds
Here is a list of low fee passively managed globally diversi…ed investment funds that meet the criteria for optimal investment highlighted in the …rst page of this ‡yer.
